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Donna Haraway's “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 1980s” remains 
a major reference point for twenty-first century cyber- and techno- feminists. However, its broader political and 
philosophical relevance has become increasingly obscured. The emergence of twenty-first century accelerationism, 
I will argue, calls for renewed engagement with Haraway’s iconic text. Through bringing accelerationism into 
contact with cyborg ontology, I aim to show how accelerationism might benefit from further engagement with 
the history of technofeminist thought. Such engagement, I will argue, not only assists in clarifying what 
accelerationism is, but also contributes to developing what it might be, through providing productive responses to 
some of its major criticisms. In reconfiguring the cyborg as an “accelerationist prototype,” I hope to contribute to 
the ongoing elaboration of accelerationist politics, as well as demonstrate the continuing and perhaps increasing 
efficacy of technofeminist philosophy in the twenty-first century. 
Introduction   
Accelerationism’s technofeminist history is being made increasingly apparent. Both Laboria Cuboniks’ 
“Xenofeminist Manifesto”—the latest in a string of techno- and cyber-feminist manifestoes dating back to 
that of Donna Haraway—and the recent publication of Dea ex Machina—a feminist genealogy of 
accelerationism incorporating texts from Shulamith Firestone, Haraway, Rosi Braidotti, Nina Power, and 
others—represent concerted attempts to re-situate accelerationism “within the rich and provocative 
context of nearly fifty years of feminist theorizing about sex, gender, and technology” (Avanessian and 
Hessler, 2015).  
Although the ongoing influence of Haraway’s cyborg ontology upon twenty-first century 
technofeminism remains widely acknowledged, her broader political and philosophical import is seldom 
taken seriously . The emergence of twenty-first century accelerationism , I will argue, calls for renewed 1 2
engagement with her work . Whilst Haraway’s cyborg ontology predates accelerationism by almost 30 3
years, many of accelerationism’s provisions are not only present, but explicitly theorised in her text. Both 
manifestoes represent a call to technological arms—a future-oriented optimism driven by an appreciation 
for our essential artificiality. The “illegitimate offspring” of capitalist hegemony, cyborgs and 
 For an explanation as to why Donna Haraway’s more recent work may have caused her to be (unjustifiably) dismissed politically, 1
see Isabelle Stenger’s “Wondering about Materialism.” In L. Bryant, G. Harman, and N. Srnicek (Ed.s). (2011). The Speculative 
Turn: Continental Realism and Materialism (p. 371).
 Throughout this paper, the use of the word “accelerationism” refers specifically to the contemporary phenomenon of “Left 2
accelerationism,” inaugurated in 2013 with the publication of Alex Williams' and Nick Srnicek's “#Accelerate: Manifesto for an 
Accelerationist Politics.” It refers neither to the 1970's French Hyperleft (Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard etc.) identified as 
“accelerationists” by Benjamin Noys, nor to Nick Land's 1990's techno-determinism (and its evolution) which is sometimes 
referred to as “Right accelerationism.” See the section entitled Reorientation > Revolution for an explanation of the distinction 
between accelerationism and techno-determinism.
 This emergence also calls for renewed engagement with the broader traditions of techno-and cyber- feminism—political/3
philosophical traditions pioneered by feminists such as Shulamith Firestone, Donna Haraway, Sadie Plant, and Sandy Stone. 
Whilst Shulamith Firestone and Sadie Plant have been included in #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, the selected texts are not 
representative of their more radical technofeminist tendencies. Firestone’s analysis of the resemblance between the sex dualism and 
the two modes of cultural history (the technological mode and the aesthetic mode) is the closest we get to technofeminism in the 
reader. Plant only appears in collusion with Nick Land and the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (CCRU), even though she has 
written her own book-length history of the intersections between women, feminism, machines and information technology. See 
Plant, S. (1997). Zeroes and Ones: Digital Women + The New Technoculture. London: Fourth Estate.
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accelerationists see themselves as neither innocent nor revolutionary. According to Haraway, as well as the 
accelerationists, appeals to nature, authenticity, and “original unity” are symptoms of an impotent left 
caught in a web of essentialism and fideism. By dispensing with such appeals, we can focus upon 
regenerating and re-engineering new futures.  
Importantly, this paper does not undertake to “expose” (and thereby ordain) Haraway as the unavowed 
archetype of accelerationism—congratulating her for prefiguring a movement. Rather, it is an effort to 
construct a mutant politics—something which, I will argue, emerges out of the interaction between these 
two texts. What motivates this paper is the incapacity for either Enlightenment humanism or post-
modern nihilism to reconfigure the future in the twenty-first century. Through bringing accelerationism 
into dialogue with Haraway's cyborg ontology, I aim to show how these “mutants” might hold the key to 
such a reconfiguration. Of interest are not the endless analogies we could draw between the two texts, but 
rather, the “mutant insurgencies” they make possible—three of which will be explored in the latter half of 
this paper. In uncovering these operative philosophical processes, I hope to highlight the continuing (and 
perhaps increasing) efficacy of technofeminist thought and politics in the twenty-first century. 
Reorientation > Revolution  
Accelerationism is an attempt to reposition the Left with regard to rationality and techno-social 
development. Dissatisfied with established Leftisms, which continue to “hold to a folk politics of localism, 
direct action, and relentless horizontalism,” accelerationists seek to develop new macro-political strategies, 
capable of navigating and utilising “abstraction, complexity, globality, and technology” (Williams and 
Srnicek, 2014, p. 354). What distinguishes accelerationism from established Leftisms is the claim that, 
“the material platform of neoliberalism does not need to be destroyed,” but merely “repurposed towards 
common ends” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 355): the future depends upon reorientation rather than 
revolution. Instead of abjuring technological and scientific advances “tainted” by capital, accelerationists 
aim to take advantage of these developments and reprogramme them towards post-capitalist ends 
(Williams and Srnicek, 2014). 
Naturally, accelerationism's proposals have caused controversy. There is something immediately 
unsettling about the suggestion that we simply “commandeer” capitalist infrastructure and steer it towards 
newer and better ends. Apart from sounding like a return to naive humanism—the critique of which post-
structuralists laboured over for decades—the injunction to “accelerate” elsewhere comes across as a 
nihilstic call to mindlessly escalate technological development. This latter reading gives rise to the 
mischaracterisation of accelerationism “as a kind of twenty-first century Futurism, concerned primarily 
with brute virility and machinic speed” (Avanessian and Hester, 2015). Whilst such characterisations are 
applicable to particular techno-deterministic variants of accelerationism—specifically the later writings of 
Nick Land—they cannot be so easily applied to the accelerationism put forward by Alex Williams and 
Nick Srnicek (2014). 
Land's “hypnotic” techno-determinism maintains “that capitalist speed alone could generate a global 
transition towards unparalleled technological singularity” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 351). However, 
as Williams and Srnicek (2014, pp. 351-352) argue, this kind of “speed” moves only within a “strictly 
defined set of capitalist parameters that themselves never waver.” Whilst neoliberal capitalism presents 
itself as the accelerationist system par excellence—its “essential metabolism” demanding economic growth, 
necessitating increased deregulation, and “setting free” social and technological innovation—Williams and 
Srnicek (2014, p. 355) maintain that capitalism actually inhibits acceleration: “patent wars and idea 
monopolisation,” they argue, “point to both capital’s need to move beyond competition, and capital’s 
increasingly retrograde approach to technology.” Instead of space travel, environmental innovation, and 
the exploration of the revolutionary potential of new technologies, “we exist in a time where the only 
thing which develops is marginally better consumer gadgetry” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 355). For 
them, the perceived “speed” of technological innovation under capitalism is nothing more than “the 
increasing speed of a local horizon, a simple brain-dead onrush” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 352).  
Accelerationism can be distinguished from techno-determinism in the following way: whilst the latter 
takes capitalist acceleration to be inherently (or perhaps, inevitably) liberating, the former takes 
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acceleration to be a strategic process, necessitating socio-political action and technological 
experimentation. Whilst accelerationists acknowledge that technological development is necessary for 
addressing social conflicts, they also recognise that technology alone is inadequate for this purpose
—“Never believe that technology will be sufficient to save us” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 356). 
Without socio-political action, both social and technological change remain foreclosed. For Williams and 
Srnicek (2014, p. 360), acceleration is not an inevitable “effect” of capitalism, but rather, the result of an 
ongoing “positive feedback loop of infrastructural, ideological, social, and economic transformation.” The 
point of accelerationism is neither to “halt” capitalist momentum, nor to mindlessly “unleash” it, but 
rather, to engage in a strategic process of reorientation with it.  
According to accelerationists, progressive political discourse in the twenty-first century remains 
incapacitated in the face of the increasingly complex and abstract forces of globally-integrated capital. Up 
until now, Leftist reasoning has proceeded according to the assumption that “if modernity = progress = 
capitalism = acceleration, then the only possible resistance amounts to deceleration” (Avanessian and 
Mackay, 2014, pp. 5-6). Such deccelerative reasoning tends to manifest in fantasies of “return”—“return” 
to Keynesian socialism, “return” to collective organic self-sufficiency, “return” to primitivist localism, etc. 
In opposition to this phantasmic horizontalism—which tends to fetishise the past and wait for the future
—accelerationism attempts to reorientate the present. This necessitates utilising tools and processes 
ordinarily eschewed by the Left. As Williams and Srnicek write, 
Quantification is not an evil to be eliminated, but a tool to be used in the most effective manner 
possible...The tools to be found in social network analysis, agent-based modelling, big data analytics, 
and non-equilibrium economic models, are necessary cognitive mediators for understanding complex 
systems like the modern economy. The accelerationist Left must become literate in these technical 
fields. (2014, p. 356-357) 
Thus, “between the prescription [from the established Left] for nothing but despair and an excitable 
description [from techno-determinism] that, at most, contributes infinitesmally to Skynet's burgeoning 
self-awareness,” accelerationists maintain that “a space for action can be constructed” (Mackay and 
Avanessian, 2014, p. 35). Neither fideistic withdrawal, nor thanatropic ascension, signal a “way out” for 
accelerationists. It is only through combining socio-political action with technological experimentation 
that we can commandeer the “braindead onrush” of capitalist “progress,” and steer it toward “the universal 
possibilities of the Outside” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 362). This means preserving “the gains of late 
capitalism while going further than its value system, governance structures, and mass pathologies will 
allow” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 354). 
Whilst accelerationism aligns itself with speculative philosophy—emphasising the importance of 
future-oriented inventiveness over revision and critique—its prescriptions are only comprehensible in 
terms of the dissolution of traditional political and philosophical dualisms: capitalism/anti-capitalism, 
humanism/anti-humanism, rationalism/post-structuralism. Accelerationists are often taken to be 
endorsing the former over the latter in each of these cases. Such misunderstandings arise from the reader’s 
inability to see beyond polemical categorisations. If accelerationists seek to “preserve the gains of late 
capitalism,” they must be capitalists, if they advocate for “maximal mastery over society and its 
environment,” they must be naive humanists, if they promote rationalism they must be patriarchal proto-
fascists, etc. Whilst Williams and Srnicek—eager to distinguish themselves from the “contemporary 
malaise” of the Left—condemn the fetishisation of direct action, openness, horizontality, and localism, 
they by no means abandon all hope in favour of a dystopian hyper-capitalist future. By contrast, 
accelerationists seek to develop a new Left hegemony capable of taking advantage of “the technological 
and scientific advances made possible by capitalist society” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 356). Such a 
prescription is only intelligible, however, in light of the dissolution of traditional political and 
philosophical dualisms. The first chapter of Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto enacts such a dissolution. 
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Invention > Identification 
“From One Dimensional Man,” writes Haraway (1991, p. 154), “to The Death of Nature, the analytic 
resources developed by progressives have insisted on the necessary domination of technics and recalled us 
to an imagined organic body to integrate our resistance.” To Haraway’s disappointment, Leftist political 
discourse in the latter half of the twentieth century continues to rely upon creation myths that perpetuate 
phantasmic dualisms: nature/culture, man/machine, material/ideal. According to these myths, “human 
nature” in all its formulations, “bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour,” is inhibited by the 
prevailing power structures—i.e. those of patriarchal, colonial, capitalist hegemony (Haraway, 1991, p. 
150). Under these circumstances, liberation consists in “unleashing” human nature—that constant source 
of negativity exceeding any system of oppression—and “harnessing” its transformative potential. 
Emancipation is thereby a moment of reconciliation, a return to “nature.” Revolution consists in 
remembering our origins so that we can (re)create, through our social and political institutions, the 
conditions necessary for the realisation of our original “essence.” The problem with such political 
discourse, for Haraway, is not only that it “misses most of reality”(1991, p. 150) but that it relies upon 
illusory distinctions—the illusoriness of which becomes undeniable toward the end of the twentieth 
century. 
Leftist creation myths, or “myths of original unity,” rely upon three major dualisms. Namely, (1) the 
distinction between human and animal, (2) the distinction between organism and machine, and (3) the 
distinction between the physical and the non-physical (Haraway, 1991). By the late twentieth century, 
Haraway maintains, developments in science and technology have rendered these dualisms indefensible.  
First of all, biology and evolutionary theory have thoroughly breached the boundary between humans 
and animals. “The last beachheads of uniqueness,” Haraway (1991, p. 152) writes, “have been polluted if 
not turned into amusement parks—language, tool use, social behaviour, mental events, nothing really 
convincingly settles the separation of human and animal.” The transgression of this boundary means that 
animals and humans can no longer be categorically defined in terms of “nature” and “culture.” This does 
not, however, resign us to biological determinism. The collapse of the nature/culture boundary, she insists, 
must not be understood as an appropriation or an incorporation of one category (i.e. “human” or 
“culture”) into the other category (i.e. “animal” or “nature”). After all, in order for an incorporation to 
take place, the two categories—and their distinctions—must endure. For Haraway, on the other hand, the 
collapse of the boundary between humans and animals renders both categories meaningless. What counts 
as animal and what counts as human is not only thrown into question, but this question itself is 
henceforth unintelligible—it can no longer be asked. As a result, space is opened up for new questions, 
new conceptions, and new configurations of life. 
The second mythological distinction Haraway addresses is the distinction between organisms and 
machines. “Late twentieth-century machines,” she writes, “have made thoroughly ambiguous the 
distinction between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally 
designed” (Haraway, 1991, p. 152). The traditional dialectic between idealism and materialism, between 
“spirit” and “history,” relies upon this dualism of man and machine—the collapse of which ostensibly 
leads to technological determinism. Again, Haraway refuses to see the transgression of this boundary as an 
incorporation of one category (i.e. organisms) into the other (i.e. machines). Instead, the collapse of the 
boundary between organisms and machines challenges oppressive dualisms that continue to pervade 
dialectical politics—e.g. agent/resource, maker/made, active/passive, master/slave. As Haraway (1991, p. 
180) maintains, “the machine is not an it to be animated, worshipped, or dominated. The machine is us, 
our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines, they do not dominate or 
threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they.” In other words, traditional assumptions 
regarding the distinction between humans and machine cannot account for late twentieth-century 
ontologies. Neither the glorification nor the demonisation of technology can assist in developing “a way 
out of the maze of dualisms in which we have [hitherto] explained our bodies and our tools to 
ourselves” (Haraway, 1991, p. 181). Most crucially, the mythical ideals of “organic” female embodiment 
or “natural” (unalienated) labour continue to prevent the responsible construction and deconstruction of 
new technologies, identities, and political possibilities. 
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Lastly, Haraway addresses the distinction between the physical and non-physical. “Modern machines,” 
she writes, “are quintessentially micro-electronic devices: they are everywhere and they are 
invisible” (Haraway, 1991, p. 153). The miniaturisation and mobilisation of technologies has not only 
made them portable, it has made them immaterial. “Our best machines are made of sunshine; they are all 
light and clean because they are made of nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a section of a 
spectrum” (Haraway, 1991, p. 153). In a world held together by electro-magnetic waves, distinctions 
between matter and form, physical and immaterial, break down. “Reality” no longer depends upon 
materiality—it is henceforth fluid, ubiquitous, and invisible. Such metaphysical developments confront 
politics with major challenges. As Haraway (1991, p. 162) argues, the “movement from an organic, 
industrial society to a polymorphous, information system” requires that we cease to think in terms of 
discrete objects, bodies, and spaces and begin to think in terms of “system design.” “In relation to objects 
like biotic components,” she writes, “one must think not in terms of essential properties, but in terms of 
design, boundary constraints, rates of flows, systems logics, costs of lowering constraints” (Haraway, 1991, 
p. 162). Old metaphysical categories must be abandoned if we are to be able to understand and respond 
to the new forms of domination we face. 
The cyborg emerges out of the destruction of Leftist creation myths. Cyborgs are neither human nor 
animal, neither organic nor artificial, neither physical nor immaterial. In disrupting these distinctions, 
cyborgs undermine Western traditions of science and politics—i.e. “the tradition of racist, male-dominant 
capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource for the 
production of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self from the reflections of the 
other” (Haraway, 1991 p. 150). Rather than setting up a “border war” between organisms and machines, 
cyborg politics takes responsibility for the confusion and construction of boundaries. Cyborgs have loose 
political affiliations—with socialist feminism, with post-modernism, and with utopianism. However 
cyborgs are not ideological. They are immune from collective identification. They have no origin story and 
no predetermined destination. As Haraway (1991, p. 180) writes, “A cyborg body is not innocent; it was 
not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity and so generate antagonistic dualisms without end; 
it takes irony for granted.” On the one hand, cyborgs are the end of the apocalyptic telos of Western 
individualism. On the other, they are the beginning of the possibility for new lived social and bodily 
realities as well as new political affinities.  
Mutant Manifestoes 
Despite a thirty-year age gap, Haraway's manifesto resonates deeply with Williams and Srnicek’s 
programme. Both advocate for a techno-literate incursion into capitalist hegemony—an incursion 
wrought by fragmented bodies and partial identities “spliced” into a collective will for self-mastery. At first 
glance, the figure of the cyborg looks out of place, even “monstrous,” amongst accelerationism's newly 
enlightened rationalists. Williams and Srnicek’s (2014, p. 360) “positive feedback loop of infrastructural, 
ideological, social, and economic transformation,” seems eminently sober when juxtaposed with the 
“spiral dance” of the cyborg—an “infidel heteroglossia...building and destroying machines, identities, 
categories, relationships, space stories” (Haraway, 1991, p. 181). However Haraway's anti-goddess cannot 
be relegated to the “tired residue of post-modernity” against which accelerationism pits itself (Williams 
and Srnicek, 2014, p. 360). Nor can Williams and Srnicek be passed off as part of a new generation of 
totalitarian essentialists. Whilst Haraway’s manifesto was written in the 1980s, at the height of post-
structuralism, her reinterpretation of lived experience in terms of technological and scientific materialities
—organisms and machines—subverts the tendency for continental philosophy to abjure science and 
technology. Likewise, whilst Williams and Srnicek associate themselves with enlightenment rationalism, 
their commitment to harnessing and reorienting the irrational “inhuman” forces of twenty-first century 
technological acceleration distinguishes their philosophy from “naive” humanism. Accelerationism and 
cyborg politics are best understood as philosophical anomalies—speculative constructions that break 
down philosophical border wars. “Mutants” of enlightenment humanism and post-modern nihilism 
respectively, accelerationists and cyborgs perforate classical political distinctions, disturbing entrenched 
dogmatisms and providing new pathways for thought and action.  
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The remainder of this paper constitutes a map of “mutant insurgencies.” Both Haraway and Williams 
and Srnicek, I will argue, deploy conceptual constructions that forge philosophical fault-lines, allowing 
new political entities to emerge. Three of these “mutant insurgencies” will be considered. Firstly, 
“prometheanism,” a politics that subverts humanist/anti-humanist, rationalist/post-modernist debates. 
Secondly, “hyperstition,” a methodology that problematises the relationship between idealism and 
materialism, fiction and reality. Finally, “oppositional consciousness,” a mode of political identification 
that prevents essentialist totalisation. Each of these “mutant insurgencies” is made possible in the 
interaction between Haraway and Williams and Srnicek. Together, the two manifestoes, allow for the 
elaboration of a new kind of politics—a “mutational politics” that produces inconsistencies by 
problematising entrenched political and philosophical categories.  
Prometheanism 
“One is too few, and two is only one possibility,” writes Haraway (1991, p. 180). Cyborg politics replaces 
the dialectical model of historical transformation with a different model—a model of mutation. Broadly 
speaking, mutation is a process of permanent change. It is neither natural nor unnatural and consists in 
deletions, insertions, inversions, or translocations of structural components that produce inconsistencies 
in replication. According to Haraway, “holistic politics depend on metaphors of rebirth” (1991, p. 181). 
Cyborgs, she insists, have more to do with regeneration than rebirth. “Rebirth” involves the reification of 
oppressive essentialisms—not to mention the exploitation of reproductive resources. “Regeneration,” by 
contrast, is a permanent process of mutation, of change, that induces un-premeditated possibilities. The 
salamander becomes a kind of “mascot” for mutational politics: 
For salamanders, regeneration after injury, such as the loss of a limb, involves regrowth of structure and 
restoration of function with the constant possibility of twinning or other odd topographical 
productions at the site of the former injury. The regrown limb can be monstrous, duplicated, potent. 
We have all been injured, profoundly. We require regeneration, not rebirth. (Haraway, 1991, p. 181) 
Cyborg politics is about mutation. It is about disrupting processes of replication, rather than contriving 
fantasies of rebirth. “The future” will not be “reborn” out of the ashes of the present. In order for there to 
be a future, the image of the salamander must replace that of the phoenix. 
Prometheanism—the political methodology proffered by accelerationism—is “salamander politics” par 
excellence. Abjuring attachments to ideal futures, prometheanism promotes “abductive 
experimentation” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 361). “Whilst we cannot predict the precise result of 
our actions,” Williams and Srnicek (2014, p. 361) insist, “we can determine probabilistically likely ranges 
of outcomes.” Cognisant of the contingencies involved in any form of political action, prometheanism 
combines rationality with speculative artistry in order to instigate social and political transformation. 
Prometheanism is both an attempt to move beyond enlightenment ideals of total mastery as well as post-
modern contempt for all forms of authority. Instead of naively assuming complete control over political 
outcomes, or conversely decrying all forms of mastery as “proto-fascistic,” prometheanism aims to couple 
complex systems analysis with improvisatory practices in order to work out the “best means to act in a 
complex world” (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, p. 361).  
 Ray Brassier (2014, p. 470) defines prometheanism as “simply the claim that there is no reason to 
assume a predetermined limit to what we can achieve or to the ways in which we can transform ourselves 
and our world.” In advocating for a re-examination of Enlightenment prometheanism, Brassier attempts 
to counteract the post-metaphysical “fideism” that has pervaded continental philosophy since Martin 
Heidegger . According to continental fideism, the idea of remaking the world, and remaking ourselves, “is 4
routinely denounced as a dangerous totalitarian fantasy” (Brassier, 2014, p. 469). This is because there is a 
presumed to be a “fragile equilibrium” between what is given to human beings and what is made by them 
 For a similar, and equally compelling critique of this tendency in Continental Philosophy (since Martin Heidegger), see 4
Meillasoux, Q. (2009). After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. (R. Brassier, Trans.). London: Continuum, 
specifically the second chapter entitled “Metaphysics, Fideism, Speculation.”
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(Brassier, 2014, p. 474). According to Brassier, this concept of “equilibrium” has its origins in the Kantian 
notion of finitude, which Heidegger ontologises. According to this notion, since human beings are the 
source and the condition for transcendence, we inevitably transcend every objective determination of 
ourselves. To understand ourselves like we understand other objects, “would require objectivating the 
condition of objectivation, which would be, as Arendt says, like trying to jump over our own 
shadow” (Brassier, 2014, 476). From this perspective, philosophers “who have claimed that human beings 
can radically re-engineer themselves can be denounced as metaphysicians reifying the transcendence of 
existence” (Brassier 2014, p. 476). 
However, as Brassier points out, continental fideism leads to a political impasse. In claiming that all 
objectivation is savagery, and all “progress” inherently violent, fideism renders all savageries equivalent, 
making it impossible to discriminate between them. By contrast, “prometheanism denies the 
ontologisation of finitude” (Brassier, 2014, p. 478). That is, prometheanism destroys “the equilibrium 
between the made and the given—between what human beings generate through their own 
resources...and the way the world is” (Brassier, 2014, p. 478). Whilst Brassier (2014, p. 486) acknowledges 
that savagery is indeed recapitulated in objectivation, prometheanism maintains that “some savageries are 
better than others, and that it is not only possible but necessary to discriminate between modes of 
instrumentalisation and insist that some are preferable to others.” Rather than attempting to preserve what 
Brassier (2014, p. 486) terms “the theological equilibrium between the made and the given,” 
prometheanism is about reshaping the social and technological mechanisms that shape us—it is about 
making (and remaking) the given. From the point of view of prometheanism, rationality “is not a 
supernatural faculty”—an assumption that Heidegger and others rightly criticised—rather, rationality “is 
simply a rule-governed activity...the faculty of generating and being bound by rules” (Brassier, 2014, p. 
485). Such rules are historically mutable insofar as “the ways in which we understand the world, and the 
ways in which we change the world on the basis of our understanding, are perpetually being 
redetermined” (Brassier, 2014, p. 486). 
By recognising their “essential” illegitimacy, their artificial “nature,” cyborgs and accelerationists free 
themselves from ideological fideism. Mutational politics is about disrupting the present rather than 
preserving the future. This disruption is motivated by the fact that nothing is predetermined. There is no 
divine equilibrium governing technosocial development. All that endures is artificial and ever-changing. 
Unlike traditional emancipatory discourses—which bemoan the increasing colonisation or perversion of 
“human nature”—prometheanism is a permanent process of innovation and improvisation based on the 
knowledge “that science and technology are possible means of great human satisfaction, as well as a matrix 
of complex dominations” (Haraway, 1991, p. 181). Irreverent towards revolutionary discourses that 
presume innocence in the face of capitalist technological abstraction—prometheanism assumes 
“responsibility for the social relations of science and technology” (Haraway, 1991, p. 181). Prometheanism 
is about participating in the construction and deconstruction of boundaries and relations “without having 
to refer to a divine blueprint” (Brassier, 2014, p. 485). It is about shaping the things that shape us, despite 
the fact that the outcomes of our actions can never be pre-established. 
Patricia Reed (2014) develops a detailed topography of accelerationist praxis. Dissatisfied with the 
ambiguous injunction to “accelerate,” which serves merely to popularise and polemicise the movement, 
Reed deploys seven alternative, and more modest, prescriptions which better characterise what 
accelerationism stands for. According to Reed, “accelerate” has become a buzz-word that serves to 
obfuscate the actual content of the texts and ideas associated with the movement. As a result, reactions to 
the manifesto have been hasty, plentiful, and largely superficial. Commentaries either “blindly champion 
#Accelerate (often by no other means than repetition of the tag), or condemn it as a ‘neo-futurist fascist 
travesty’” (Reed, 2014, p. 523). Reed sets out to rearticulate and respond to the ill-named “accelerate” 
movement with a series of seven prescriptions: reorientate, eccentricate, speculate, fictionalise, 
geometricise, commonise, abstractify.  
Reorientation, she writes “is about directing existing energies in (as yet) inexistent directions” (Reed, 
2014, p. 524). To reorientate is to anticipate “what could be” or “what ought to be” in order to reflexively 
restructure “what is.” Eccentrication refers to the creation “out-of-centre attractors,” that disrupt the 
centrifugal energies of normative processes (Reed, 2014, pp. 525-6). Eccentrification is designed to 
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demonstrate the contingency or mutability of particular trajectories and “magnetise” other points of 
orientation. To speculate “is to articulate and enable the contingencies of the given” to manifest themselves. 
Speculation consists in the sacrificing of a determinate political project or ideology, in favour of “an 
experimental responsiveness to epistemic, ontological and systematic variation” (Reed, 2014, pp. 527-8). 
To fictionalise is to break out of the “diagnostic register” of the Left and “acknowledge the power of belief 
that is necessary for the construction of speculative futures” (Reed, 2014, p. 528). To geometricise is to 
“engineer openings” in human perception. That is, to think outside anthropocentric spatio-temporal 
registers—even if we cannot completely overcome our phenomenological constraints. To commonise is to 
avoid totalising commandments and universalist claims. It is to create a commons, “a generic thought of 
value creation that formally morphs under localised, material modes of practice” (Reed, 2014, p. 534) . 5
And finally, to abstractify is to separate what is from what could be. It is to deny that abstraction is an 
inherently malevolent force—acknowledging it as a necessary part of forging new collectives and 
accommodating new ontologies “beyond the immediately perceptible” world-as-is (Reed, 2014, p. 535). 
Reed’s (2014, p. 524) seven prescriptions not only provide us with a detailed topography of 
accelerationist praxis, they effectively “de/restructure the existent” through naming. Whilst the seven 
prescriptions pertain to an incredibly extensive range of philosophical and political questions, what they 
have in common is their mutational structure. In other words, each prescription—reorientate, 
eccentricate, speculate, fictionalise, geometricise, commonise, abstractify—designates a different 
mutational process, that transgresses traditional philosophical distinctions: human/nonhuman, material/
ideal, real/virtual, natural/artificial. These processes attest to a greater mutational ontology wherein 
transcendental conditions and material entities are never permanent, fixed, or given, but always mutually 
transformative. Mutate-ability signifies something fundamentally different from the all-encompassing 
transcendental immutability of Being. Whilst the latter designates a divine equilibrium between the made 
and the given that must be “preserved,” the former refers to the perpetual plasticity and transmutability of 
both immanence and transcendence. 
Hyperstition 
“Hyperstition” was first coined by the renegade academics of the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit 
(CCRU) . It combines the prefix “hype” with the word “superstition” in order to account for how fictional 6
entities or “ideas” make themselves real by causally bringing about their own reality. “Hyperstition aims to 
flatten the transcendence of superstition,” emphasising the immanent effects wrought by fictions upon the 
world—for instance, the capacity for “hype” to shape and manoeuvre the market (Greenspan, 2004). 
Importantly, whilst superstition operates through diffusing belief, hyperstition functions by mobilising a 
positive un-belief, designed to de-programme ideology and potentiate mutations. According to the CCRU 
(2004, p. 276), fictions are not “transcendental screens” removed from the world,; rather, they are 
sorcerous interventions, “active agents of transformation.” 
Sadie Plant (1997) describes how the mathematical theorisation of the Difference/Analytic Engine 
actualised the future of digital technologies. Ada Lovelace's nineteenth-century invention was destined to 
remain one of “pen, ink, and paper.” However, as Plant points out, its collateral effects upon the present 
were immeasurable. “While they may have left few trails of the kind which can easily be followed and 
packaged into neat and linear historical accounts, Ada and her software did not evaporate. The programs 
began to run as soon as she assembled them” (Plant, 1997, p. 21). In other words, whilst nineteenth 
century engineering lacked the technical capacity to “run” Ada's software, her mathematical formulae were 
already running—inducing their own subsequent actualisation. For instance, Ada's (and her collaborator 
 Importantly, this is something which Reed is not sure Accelerationism itself achieves, given its almost entirely “white-Euro-male-5
origins” (2014, p. 533).
 These days the CCRU consists largely of a maze of dead hyperlinks. However, fragments of their writings continue to be 6
exhumed from the internet. See Nick Land’s Circuitries; Sadie Plant and Nick Land’s Cyberpositive; the CCRU’s Cybernetic 
Culture and Swarmachines—all published in Avanessian, A. & Mackay, R. (Ed.s). (2014). #Accelerate: The Accelerationist 
Reader. Falmouth, UK: Urbanomic. See also Land, N. (2011). Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007. (R. Mackay 
and R. Brassier, Ed.s). Falmouth, UK: Urbanomic. 
40 • Platform: Journal of Media and Communication 
Volume 6.2 (2015): 33–45.
Charles Babbage's) ideas contributed to the standardisation of mechanised lathes leading to crucial 
advancements in engineering and scientific experimentation that would later influence computing itself. 
As Plant (1997, p. 22)  maintains, “The Engine was assembling the processes and components from which 
it would eventually be built.” 
Plant’s account of the conducive consequences of the Analytic Engine effectively demonstrates how 
hyperstition functions—how seemingly un-actualisable ideas bring about the conditions necessary for 
their own actualisation. According to the hyperstitional model of the universe, theories are neither 
ambivalent abstractions, nor mere adjuncts to action—they are themselves actors, insurgent agents of 
actualisation. For the CCRU (2004, p. 276), that “reality is composed of fictions” is not an 
epistemological stopgap. It is an affirmation of “the magical powers of incantation and manifestation,” an 
argument for “the efficacy of the virtual.” Rather than remaining isolated within the realm of the 
perceptual, “contained by a metaphysical frame,” theories and fictions are imbued with causal efficacy—
they populate the world, transforming its material constitution (CCRU, 2004, p. 277). 
Employed in different ways by both Haraway and Williams and Srnicek, hyperstition couples analyses 
with artificial agencies, cultivating positive systems of unbelief conducive to political, scientific, and 
technological transformation. Whilst accelerationism—with its push to free the latent potentialities of 
technological acceleration—presupposes hyperstition , Haraway’s cyborg ontology is both an explicit 7
theorisation and a self-conscious performance of it. In the opening to her manifesto, Haraway proclaims 
that the cyborg is, “a creature of social reality and a creature of fiction” (1991, p. 149). For her, social 
relations and lived experiences are “crucial” political constructions. They are artificial realities, hybrids of 
fact and fiction that intervene in the world, bringing about new incarnations. According to the manifesto, 
Liberation rests on the construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, 
and so of possibility. The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as 
women’s experience in the late twentieth century. This is a struggle over life and death, but the 
boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion. (Haraway, 1991, p. 149) 
Cyborg mythology is both an interpretive fiction and an interventionist tool. It is an attempt to alter 
reality by problematising it—a process that takes the imaginary beyond the bounds of transcendental 
apperception and into the material world. “The cyborg,” Haraway (1991, p. 150) writes, “is a condensed 
image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centres structuring any possibility of 
historical transformation.” Fact and fiction, reality and mythology, mutually constitute one another. 
Together, science fiction and social reality make up the conditions for the emergence of new possibilities. 
Mythos is neither the representation nor the misrepresentation of “reality” for Haraway. Strictly 
speaking, mythos is reality in that the two things cannot be separated out from one another. But this does 
not make them the same thing. In contrast to Guy Debord’s “spectacle” or Jean Baudrillard’s 
“simulacrum,” Haraway does not interpret the dissolution of the boundary between reality and fiction to 
be one of incorporation or subsumption. Whilst many Marxisms refer to the capitalist “colonisation” of 
the real—a process that must be reversed by appealing to an authentic or non-fictional “outside”—
Haraway insists that any formulation of “the real” is always already mythology—something that feminists 
are perhaps more attuned to. The idea that “the real” is always already mythology is very different from the 
idea that that reality has become incorporated into or colonised by mythology. Whilst the latter threatens 
us with subsumption and determinism, the former posits a dynamic interplay where reality and 
mythology mutually transform and reinforce one another—making possible new couplings, mutations, 
and the emergence of new entities.  
Feminism has always been speculative: it has to be. In order to avoid reifying oppressive dualisms, 
feminists are forced to disrupt the present—to construct futures without reference to patriarchal pasts (or 
 The Publication of #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader is a self-professed instance of “hyperstition.” In the introduction to the 7
reader (p. 8), Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian describe the book as an attempt “to participate in the writing of a 
philosophical counterhistory, the construction of a genealogy of accelerationism...at the same time producing accelerationism 
‘itself ’ as a fictional or hyperstitional anticipation of intelligence to come.”
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presents). Haraway calls the hyperstitional practices of feminist authors, “cyborg writing.” Examples of 
cyborg writing include the biomythography of women of colour and [the] monstrous imaginaries of 
feminist science fiction writers—which disrupt oppressive patterns of recognition and allow new non-
essentialist identities to emerge . Cyborg writing, Haraway (1991, pp. 175-177) maintains, is neither 8
phallic nor innocent, it refuses to be reduced to dialectics. Instead, cyborg writing seeks to displace the 
“hierarchical dualisms of naturalised identities” that continue to oppress women, people of colour, first 
nations peoples, nature, workers, and animals. The reification of innocence, of originary wholeness, or 
oneness with nature are nothing but ideological resources for masculine autonomy—which takes respite in 
the wholesome bosom of the Other (Haraway, 1991, p. 177). Cyborg writing is about polluting “nature.” 
It is about breaking down clean distinctions between organism and machine, human and animal, civilised 
and primitive, whole and part, man and woman. Cyborg writing is about recognising “oneself as fully 
implicated in the world,” and as such freeing oneself “of the need to root politics in identification, 
vanguard parties, purity, and mothering” (Haraway, 1991, p. 176). A promethean praxis, rather than an 
ideological appeal, cyborg writing is about seizing the tools to mark the world that marks us (Haraway, 
1991, p. 175). It is about rewriting bodies and social realities. Haraway’s cyborg writing is an insurgent 
political practice—a mixture of analysis and speculative artistry based on the knowledge that the actual 
and the virtual are always co-extensive. Thinking of the universe in these terms allows us to step outside of 
the antagonistic dualisms of dialectical politics and engage in imaginative reconstructions of the world—
reconstructions which are always also reconfigurations. 
Oppositional Consciousness 
One of the most (if not the most) ubiquitous critique of accelerationism is that it reaffirms “grand 
narrative” politics. According to Suhail Malik and Armen Avanessian, 
Cultural leftism's embrace in the 1990s of post-modernism, identity politics, and the turn to ethics (via 
the human rights settlements) as the primary organising determinants of a social justice agenda that 
militated against standardisation not only ruled out any appeal to the 'grand narratives' of modernity 
as the basis for leftism but, more actively, sought to delegitimise any such universalising criteria. (Malik 
& Avanessian, 2016, pp. 5-6). 
Importantly, post-structuralism sought to combat oppression and political marginalisation by promoting 
the irreducible nature of different identities, discourses, and experiences. Tied to this acknowledgment of 
subjective irreducibility was an accompanying acknowledgment of the “singular, irreproducible, and even 
untransmittable” nature of particular political claims and social demands (Malik and Avanessian, 2016, p. 
6). Through engaging in various practices of social, historical, and cultural deconstruction, post-
structuralists sought to relativise, and thereby destabilise, the universal and objective status of particular 
discourses—e.g. scientific “truth” and instrumental reason. However, as Malik and Avanessian  (2016, p. 
6) point out, post-structuralism’s wholesale divestment from universal theorising “has resulted in social, 
cultural, and political assertions being formulated primarily in terms of subjectively-organised claims that 
caution against extending beyond themselves for fear of imposing a microimperialism.” 
Accelerationism's perceived effacement of subjectivity, locality, and lived experience—in favour of 
abstract globalism—troubles feminists and postcolonial theorists in particular. It is doubtful to many 
critics whether Enlightenment values (truth, justice, rationality, self-mastery etc.) are extricable from the 
oppressions inherent in the original Enlightenment project (colonialism, patriarchy, slavery etc.) As such, 
many critics regard accelerationism's reaffirmation of rationality, universality and instrumentality to be 
reaffirming oppression—cue accusations of imperialism, chauvinism, and proto-fascism. However, such 
arguments—apart from overlooking accelerationism's critical engagement with the Enlightenment, 
embodied in their argument for historically mutable normative political schemas, rather than immutable 
 Haraway cites Joanna Russ, Samuel R. Delaney, John Varley, James Tiptree, Jr, Octavia Butler, Monique Wittig, Vonda 8
McIntyre, Mary Douglas, Luce Irigaray, Susan Griffin, Audre Lorde, Adrienne Rich, and Cherríe Moraga as examples of cyborg 
writers.
42 • Platform: Journal of Media and Communication 
Volume 6.2 (2015): 33–45.
metaphysical grounds or categories—often rely upon reviving essentialisms: universality is essentially 
absolutist, mastery is necessarily fascistic, rationality is inherently patriarchal, etc. Rather than entering into 
what has become a stifling political debate, I would like to propose Haraway's cyborg ontology as a model 
for political universality that not only avoids reaffirming oppressions, but also acts as a safeguard against 
them. This model, I will argue, is at once appropriate to accelerationism and useful for addressing its 
major criticisms in a productive way. 
Unlike many of her post-structuralist counterparts, Haraway affirms essential artificiality. Whilst most 
established Leftisms interpret this artificiality as “the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet,” 
Haraway (1991, p. 154) sees it as the potential for new forms of political coalition based upon affinity. US 
Left movements and US feminism, she writes, have responded to the “painful fragmentation” of successive 
identity crises “by endless splitting and searches for a new essential unity. But there has also been a 
growing recognition of another response through coalition—affinity, not identity” (Haraway, 1991, p. 
155). In order to explore the possibilities of political affinity, Haraway (1991, p. 155) examines the 
formation and history of the “women of colour” movement in America, arguing that the galvanisation of 
the women of colour movement can be thought of in terms of what Chela Sandoval coined “oppositional 
consciousness.” Oppositional consciousness is, broadly speaking, “the conscious appropriation of 
negation” (Haraway, 1991, p. 156). For women of colour, oppositional consciousness is the conscious 
appropriation of a double negation. Whilst, like others, they find themselves negated by white patriarchal 
colonial capitalism, unlike many others, women of colour also find themselves negated by privileged 
categories of the oppressed (“women” and “blacks”). “Woman of colour” thereby constitutes a political 
“identity” for those “refused stable membership in the social categories of race, sex, or class” (Haraway, 
1991, p. 155). Importantly, whilst oppositional consciousness arose out of necessity for non-white, third-
world feminists, Haraway’s (white, first-world) redeployment of it—in terms of the cyborg—transforms 
oppositional consciousness into a universalist strategy. According to Haraway, “woman of colour” is a 
political identity constructed out of non-identities. As a result, it provides us with a model of political 
identity that avoids reifying oppressive essentialisms. Like the woman of colour, Haraway (1991, p. 155) 
maintains, the cyborg has no natural origin or essence—she is artificial. An illegitimate bundle of 
negations, she can appeal to nothing but her “otherness, difference, and specificity.”  
According to Haraway, a cyborg kinship based upon oppositional consciousness would not rely upon 
“the logic of appropriation, incorporation, and taxonomic identification” (1991, p. 157) implicit in 
traditional revolutionary discourses. Such kinship forecloses the possibility for relations of domination 
(e.g. patriarchy, colonialism, capitalism) to be justified or challenged by way of appeals to totalising 
universalities or essentialisms. What distinguishes both cyborgs and women of colour from the traditional 
revolutionary “subject” is an appreciation for their essential artificiality. “With the hard won recognition 
of their social and historical constitution, gender, race, and class cannot provide the basis for belief in 
‘essential’ unity” (Haraway, 1991, p. 155). Cyborgs regard themselves as neither innocent, nor 
revolutionary—they are painfully aware of their status as “the illegitimate offspring of militarism and 
patriarchal capitalism.” (Haraway, 1991, p. 151). However, as Haraway (1991, p. 151) insists, 
“illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins.” Through dispensing with myths of 
original unity, cyborgs gain the capacity “to build an effective unity that does not replicate the 
imperialising, totalising revolutionary subjects of previous Marxisms and feminisms” (Haraway, 1991, p. 
156). Instead of appealing to a naturalised identity, the figure of the cyborg engages in resistance through 
ongoing and ever-changing practices of artificial recoupling and mutation.  
In constructing a universal political identity out of oppositional consciousness, Haraway provides a 
model for accelerationist subjectivity which not only avoids, but actively forecloses, imperialising 
oppression. Oppositional consciousness facilitates the formation of collective political affinities based on 
partial identities and shared struggles. Rather than appealing to metaphysical principles, or unifying 
essentialisms, Haraway seeks to create new futures by way of illegitimate couplings and potent fusions. 
Feminists—especially women of colour, as well as queer and trans* subjects—have long relied upon the 
production of artificial identities for survival. These acts of “personal and political pollution” are not 
symptomatic of atomised individualism, or a blind faith in technological development. Rather, they are 
concerted attempts to move beyond totalising essentialisms and open up new possibilities for politics. 
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Williams and Srnicek (2014, p. 360) insist that the Left must “move beyond the notion that an 
organically generated global proletariat already exists [and] instead…knit together a disparate array of 
partial proletarian identities, often embodied in post-Fordist forms of precarious labour.” Whilst Williams 
and Srnicek fail to develop a theory of the accelerationist subject, Haraway's cyborg—with its 
commitment to political coalition and collective self-mastery—represents an appropriate candidate. 
Furthermore, the figure of the cyborg (with its origins in the woman of colour movement) might 
encourage further engagement with questions concerning colonialism, race, sex, and gender and their 
relationship to global or universal anti-capitalist agendas—something decidedly lacking in the 
accelerationist manifesto. The use of the cyborg as a potential model for accelerationist subjectivity 
represents one of the many ways in which accelerationist politics could benefit from further engagement 
with the history of technofeminist thought—a history to which it, arguably, owes much of its existence.  
Conclusion  
Accelerationists tend to oscillate between championing Marxian orthodoxies, advocating planetary 
techno-transcendence, and invoking enlightenment rationalism. As Patricia Reed’s article demonstrates, it 
is difficult to determine exactly what accelerationism stands for. The construction of a genealogy or an 
ontology appropriate to the movement seems eminently problematic. As Mackay and Avanessian (2014, 
p. 7) observe, the history of accelerationism consists almost completely of “isolated eruptions which each 
time sink without trace under a sea of unanimous censure and/or dismissive scorn.” Despite this, 
reconstructing accelerationism’s genealogies is an effective way of exploring and assessing its possibilities—
both as a philosophical configuration and a political proposition (Mackay and Avanessian, 2014, p. 7). 
The aim of this article is to contribute to the efforts of other feminist theorists currently working to re-
contextualise accelerationism within the history of technofeminist thought. Accelerationism’s current lack 
of association with technofeminist philosophers such as Haraway is to the detriment of both 
accelerationism and contemporary feminism. This is something that the editors of Dea ex Machina and 
the authors of the “Xenofeminist Manifesto” are attempting to combat. Whilst many have acknowledged 
accelerationism’s potential usefulness for contemporary gender politics, we are yet to adequately 
acknowledge gender politics’ usefulness for accelerationism. By showing how accelerationism might 
benefit from further engagement with Haraway's ideas, I have attempted to reorientate debates 
surrounding accelerationism—away from antagonistic impasses and towards constructive collaborations, 
artificial couplings, and potent fusions.  
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